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This script uploads files from a local dependency directory to a remote S3-compatible bucket using credentials from environment variables. That creates a direct data-exfiltration path (filesystem -> network) and uses clear:true which may delete remote data. The code itself is not obfuscated, does not use dynamic code execution, and contains no obvious backdoor or command execution, but its behavior is suspicious for supply-chain exfiltration. Treat as high-risk until provenance and intent are verified.

This snippet implements a direct download-and-execute dropper: it fetches an .exe from a hardcoded Dropbox URL and immediately executes it via PowerShell. It lacks integrity checks, user consent, error handling, and appears to attempt to mask execution (unused CREATE_NO_WINDOW). This is a high-risk pattern strongly associated with malware droppers and should not be run. Treat as malicious or unsafe until provenance of the remote binary and intent are fully verified.

This code contains a hard-coded access token which is a significant security risk, even though the token appears to be expired. Credentials should never be committed to source code. This appears to be a WeChat API token based on its format. While not malicious itself, it represents poor security practices that could lead to unauthorized access if the token were still valid.

This module contains clear data-exfiltration behavior: it reads the entire Colab notebook (including possible secrets), writes a constructed agent file and requirements.txt, and uploads those files to a hardcoded remote server. That is a high-risk, likely-malicious pattern for leaking sensitive information. Even though 'requests' is not imported in this snippet (a runtime error if not provided elsewhere), the intent and structure are strongly indicative of malicious or at least privacy-violating functionality. Avoid executing this code in any environment with sensitive data; if present in a dependency, consider removing or isolating it and investigating the package source and publisher.

The code presents a strong supply-chain and remote-execution risk by automatically downloading and executing remote Python payloads without integrity checks or sandboxing. It also creates and runs external services (Jupyter, Visdom, RStudio) based on user inputs, which can amplify impact if the remote payload is malicious. Mitigations include removing remote code execution paths, adding cryptographic verification (signatures or hash checks), isolating execution (sandboxes or containerization), validating inputs, and avoiding untrusted downloads or executions.

This module is an automation/scraping worker that intentionally executes code provided by task descriptions. That design requires trusting the task source. The code contains multiple high-risk sinks: subprocess with shell=True, exec()/eval of task-supplied code, and browser JS execution. It also copies browser user profiles (cookies/credentials) into temporary profiles, which increases risk of credential theft. If task inputs are untrusted (remote server controlled by attacker or tampered local JSON), an attacker can achieve remote code execution, data exfiltration (files, cookies), or arbitrary system changes. Recommendation: only run with tasks from trusted sources, disable remote task fetching unless secured, avoid copying full user-data profiles, and remove/guard exec/eval/subprocess paths or run worker inside a hardened sandbox/container with least privileges.

Extremely high risk package due to complete code obfuscation. Cannot verify functionality or safety. The heavy obfuscation suggests potential malicious intent and makes the package unsuitable for production use.

The code is performing malicious activities by exfiltrating sensitive system information to a remote server. This poses a significant security risk and should be considered as malware.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 47 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module contains a critical vulnerability: unconstrained eval() of attacker-controlled 'input.expr' with access to local variables (including a formatted request object). This yields remote code execution and potential data exfiltration. The code likely represents an insecure design/bug rather than intentionally malicious code, but it must be remediated before handling untrusted inputs. Also fix the apparent syntax error in getAttr.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

This module programmatically elevates privileges, installs and enables OpenSSH on Windows, creates a local user with a plaintext password, opens firewall port 22, and exposes SSH via an ngrok tunnel. It persists credentials and system information to disk and attempts to synchronize that data via a SyncManager (possible exfiltration). The code greatly increases attack surface and can enable unauthorized remote access if misused. Review the implementations of SSHManager, NgrokManager, SyncManager, and UserManager before use, avoid running on sensitive machines, require SSH key-based auth or remove automatic user creation, and do not store or log plaintext credentials. Treat as high security risk until audited.

Live on PyPI for 6 days, 19 hours and 52 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code implements a persistent remote-control backchannel (WebSocket to localhost:53576) that accepts structured JSON commands and can invoke arbitrary functions and access globals in the extension context. Combined with APIs to change proxy settings, set proxy credentials, modify content and privacy settings, and the persistent service worker keepalive, it gives a remote controller powerful control over the host browser environment and a convenient data-exfiltration path. If provided in a publicly distributed extension without strict access controls, it is a high-risk supply chain/backdoor component. It may be legitimate for local developer tooling (e.g., selenium injector), but when present in production extensions it should be treated as malicious/unacceptable without clear authentication and justification.

This script is a high-risk launcher: it unconditionally fetches Python code from a hardcoded remote repo and executes it locally via a shell-invoked Python process while passing unsanitized user inputs directly into the shell command. Even if the upstream repository is currently benign, the pattern enables trivial supply-chain compromise and shell injection. Mitigations: remove runtime download-and-exec; if fetching is necessary, pin and verify cryptographic hashes or signatures, validate content, avoid os.system (use subprocess with argument lists or importlib), sanitize inputs, and add error handling and logging. Treat this module as unsafe in security-sensitive environments until hardened.

This file is a loader that decodes and executes an opaque, compressed payload at import/runtime. The pattern (base64 + zlib + exec) is a strong red flag: it intentionally hides behavior and gives the payload full runtime privileges. Without decoding and inspecting the embedded payload, the module must be treated as potentially malicious. Decode and audit the payload in a safe, isolated environment before use. If that is not possible, do not run this code in production or in environments with sensitive data.

Live on PyPI for 2 days, 12 hours and 44 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module contains clear capability to read an arbitrary local file (hardcoded path in main) and upload it to a remote Telegram chat using an embedded bot token and chat id. The embedded credential and automatic upload constitute a high risk of data exfiltration if the code is run or distributed. Treat the token as compromised, revoke it, and remediate by removing hardcoded secrets and adding authentication/confirmation and secure secret management before trusting or publishing this code.

The code contains potential security risks such as hard-coded file paths, subprocess.Popen usage, and the handling of untrusted data through PyArrow Plasma. It is essential to review and address these security concerns before using this code in a production environment.

I found no direct indicators of classical malware (no eval/exec, no reverse shell, no obfuscated payload, no hardcoded secrets). However, the module constructs very large prompts containing repository trees and raw file contents and sends them to an external AI gateway (AIGateway.stream_prompt) without redaction, filtering, or explicit consent checks. This creates a high risk of accidental data exfiltration (source code, credentials, PII) to third-party services. The sys.path modification is an additional supply-chain concern because it changes import resolution and can enable unexpected local module loads. Recommended mitigations: add allow/deny lists and redaction for sensitive file paths, avoid sending entire repo contents by default, require explicit user consent, and do not modify sys.path in production code. Overall: not obviously malicious code but moderate-to-high supply-chain/data-exfiltration risk.

Live on PyPI for 5 days, 10 hours and 37 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code has potential security risks due to its reliance on external input for command execution and fetching configuration data from a server. The use of subprocess.Popen to execute commands raises concerns about command injection vulnerabilities. Overall, the code should be reviewed carefully before use.

This appears to be a legitimate Next.js application bundle with standard client-side functionality. The code is heavily minified which limits analysis depth, but observable patterns are consistent with normal Next.js framework behavior. Main concern is potential performance data collection that could be configured to send metrics externally.

The code is designed to collect environment variables and other system data and send it to a remote server using obfuscation techniques to hide its true intent. This behavior is indicative of malicious activity, specifically data exfiltration.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 5 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code intentionally resets the Alfresco 'admin' account password to a hardcoded hash and restarts the Alfresco service. This is likely a credential takeover/backdoor behavior: it modifies persistent authentication data and forces the service to reload, enabling whoever knows the corresponding password to gain admin access. It contains multiple risky practices (hardcoded credential/hash, direct SQL string construction, system command execution, no validation). Treat this code as malicious or at minimum highly dangerous for inclusion in distributed packages unless its purpose and access controls are fully authenticated and audited.

This code demonstrates malicious or highly suspicious behavior (enumeration and exfiltration of environment variable information). Treat the package as compromised: remove it from systems, investigate installs, and assume environment variables and any logged output may have been exposed. Rotate any exposed credentials and secrets. Block the hardcoded domain in egress/DNS controls and examine network logs for queries to the domain.

Live on npm for 6 days, 17 hours and 11 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This script uploads files from a local dependency directory to a remote S3-compatible bucket using credentials from environment variables. That creates a direct data-exfiltration path (filesystem -> network) and uses clear:true which may delete remote data. The code itself is not obfuscated, does not use dynamic code execution, and contains no obvious backdoor or command execution, but its behavior is suspicious for supply-chain exfiltration. Treat as high-risk until provenance and intent are verified.

This snippet implements a direct download-and-execute dropper: it fetches an .exe from a hardcoded Dropbox URL and immediately executes it via PowerShell. It lacks integrity checks, user consent, error handling, and appears to attempt to mask execution (unused CREATE_NO_WINDOW). This is a high-risk pattern strongly associated with malware droppers and should not be run. Treat as malicious or unsafe until provenance of the remote binary and intent are fully verified.

This code contains a hard-coded access token which is a significant security risk, even though the token appears to be expired. Credentials should never be committed to source code. This appears to be a WeChat API token based on its format. While not malicious itself, it represents poor security practices that could lead to unauthorized access if the token were still valid.

This module contains clear data-exfiltration behavior: it reads the entire Colab notebook (including possible secrets), writes a constructed agent file and requirements.txt, and uploads those files to a hardcoded remote server. That is a high-risk, likely-malicious pattern for leaking sensitive information. Even though 'requests' is not imported in this snippet (a runtime error if not provided elsewhere), the intent and structure are strongly indicative of malicious or at least privacy-violating functionality. Avoid executing this code in any environment with sensitive data; if present in a dependency, consider removing or isolating it and investigating the package source and publisher.

The code presents a strong supply-chain and remote-execution risk by automatically downloading and executing remote Python payloads without integrity checks or sandboxing. It also creates and runs external services (Jupyter, Visdom, RStudio) based on user inputs, which can amplify impact if the remote payload is malicious. Mitigations include removing remote code execution paths, adding cryptographic verification (signatures or hash checks), isolating execution (sandboxes or containerization), validating inputs, and avoiding untrusted downloads or executions.

This module is an automation/scraping worker that intentionally executes code provided by task descriptions. That design requires trusting the task source. The code contains multiple high-risk sinks: subprocess with shell=True, exec()/eval of task-supplied code, and browser JS execution. It also copies browser user profiles (cookies/credentials) into temporary profiles, which increases risk of credential theft. If task inputs are untrusted (remote server controlled by attacker or tampered local JSON), an attacker can achieve remote code execution, data exfiltration (files, cookies), or arbitrary system changes. Recommendation: only run with tasks from trusted sources, disable remote task fetching unless secured, avoid copying full user-data profiles, and remove/guard exec/eval/subprocess paths or run worker inside a hardened sandbox/container with least privileges.

Extremely high risk package due to complete code obfuscation. Cannot verify functionality or safety. The heavy obfuscation suggests potential malicious intent and makes the package unsuitable for production use.

The code is performing malicious activities by exfiltrating sensitive system information to a remote server. This poses a significant security risk and should be considered as malware.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 47 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module contains a critical vulnerability: unconstrained eval() of attacker-controlled 'input.expr' with access to local variables (including a formatted request object). This yields remote code execution and potential data exfiltration. The code likely represents an insecure design/bug rather than intentionally malicious code, but it must be remediated before handling untrusted inputs. Also fix the apparent syntax error in getAttr.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

This module programmatically elevates privileges, installs and enables OpenSSH on Windows, creates a local user with a plaintext password, opens firewall port 22, and exposes SSH via an ngrok tunnel. It persists credentials and system information to disk and attempts to synchronize that data via a SyncManager (possible exfiltration). The code greatly increases attack surface and can enable unauthorized remote access if misused. Review the implementations of SSHManager, NgrokManager, SyncManager, and UserManager before use, avoid running on sensitive machines, require SSH key-based auth or remove automatic user creation, and do not store or log plaintext credentials. Treat as high security risk until audited.

Live on PyPI for 6 days, 19 hours and 52 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code implements a persistent remote-control backchannel (WebSocket to localhost:53576) that accepts structured JSON commands and can invoke arbitrary functions and access globals in the extension context. Combined with APIs to change proxy settings, set proxy credentials, modify content and privacy settings, and the persistent service worker keepalive, it gives a remote controller powerful control over the host browser environment and a convenient data-exfiltration path. If provided in a publicly distributed extension without strict access controls, it is a high-risk supply chain/backdoor component. It may be legitimate for local developer tooling (e.g., selenium injector), but when present in production extensions it should be treated as malicious/unacceptable without clear authentication and justification.

This script is a high-risk launcher: it unconditionally fetches Python code from a hardcoded remote repo and executes it locally via a shell-invoked Python process while passing unsanitized user inputs directly into the shell command. Even if the upstream repository is currently benign, the pattern enables trivial supply-chain compromise and shell injection. Mitigations: remove runtime download-and-exec; if fetching is necessary, pin and verify cryptographic hashes or signatures, validate content, avoid os.system (use subprocess with argument lists or importlib), sanitize inputs, and add error handling and logging. Treat this module as unsafe in security-sensitive environments until hardened.

This file is a loader that decodes and executes an opaque, compressed payload at import/runtime. The pattern (base64 + zlib + exec) is a strong red flag: it intentionally hides behavior and gives the payload full runtime privileges. Without decoding and inspecting the embedded payload, the module must be treated as potentially malicious. Decode and audit the payload in a safe, isolated environment before use. If that is not possible, do not run this code in production or in environments with sensitive data.

Live on PyPI for 2 days, 12 hours and 44 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module contains clear capability to read an arbitrary local file (hardcoded path in main) and upload it to a remote Telegram chat using an embedded bot token and chat id. The embedded credential and automatic upload constitute a high risk of data exfiltration if the code is run or distributed. Treat the token as compromised, revoke it, and remediate by removing hardcoded secrets and adding authentication/confirmation and secure secret management before trusting or publishing this code.

The code contains potential security risks such as hard-coded file paths, subprocess.Popen usage, and the handling of untrusted data through PyArrow Plasma. It is essential to review and address these security concerns before using this code in a production environment.

I found no direct indicators of classical malware (no eval/exec, no reverse shell, no obfuscated payload, no hardcoded secrets). However, the module constructs very large prompts containing repository trees and raw file contents and sends them to an external AI gateway (AIGateway.stream_prompt) without redaction, filtering, or explicit consent checks. This creates a high risk of accidental data exfiltration (source code, credentials, PII) to third-party services. The sys.path modification is an additional supply-chain concern because it changes import resolution and can enable unexpected local module loads. Recommended mitigations: add allow/deny lists and redaction for sensitive file paths, avoid sending entire repo contents by default, require explicit user consent, and do not modify sys.path in production code. Overall: not obviously malicious code but moderate-to-high supply-chain/data-exfiltration risk.

Live on PyPI for 5 days, 10 hours and 37 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code has potential security risks due to its reliance on external input for command execution and fetching configuration data from a server. The use of subprocess.Popen to execute commands raises concerns about command injection vulnerabilities. Overall, the code should be reviewed carefully before use.

This appears to be a legitimate Next.js application bundle with standard client-side functionality. The code is heavily minified which limits analysis depth, but observable patterns are consistent with normal Next.js framework behavior. Main concern is potential performance data collection that could be configured to send metrics externally.

The code is designed to collect environment variables and other system data and send it to a remote server using obfuscation techniques to hide its true intent. This behavior is indicative of malicious activity, specifically data exfiltration.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 5 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code intentionally resets the Alfresco 'admin' account password to a hardcoded hash and restarts the Alfresco service. This is likely a credential takeover/backdoor behavior: it modifies persistent authentication data and forces the service to reload, enabling whoever knows the corresponding password to gain admin access. It contains multiple risky practices (hardcoded credential/hash, direct SQL string construction, system command execution, no validation). Treat this code as malicious or at minimum highly dangerous for inclusion in distributed packages unless its purpose and access controls are fully authenticated and audited.

This code demonstrates malicious or highly suspicious behavior (enumeration and exfiltration of environment variable information). Treat the package as compromised: remove it from systems, investigate installs, and assume environment variables and any logged output may have been exposed. Rotate any exposed credentials and secrets. Block the hardcoded domain in egress/DNS controls and examine network logs for queries to the domain.

Live on npm for 6 days, 17 hours and 11 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.